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Is There No Simple Battery Under Illinois
Law?
AZHAR J. MINHAS*

INTRODUCTION

Section 5/12-4(b)(8) of the Illinois Criminal Code enhances simple
batteries to aggravated batteries in instances when a battery has been
committed "on or about a public way, public property or public place of
accommodation or amusement."' The statute has been interpreted and
applied by the courts in an ever more inclusive way. This has opened the
door for the abuse of prosecutorial discretion in applying the statute and
has led the courts away from effecting the legislative intent, as it can be
ascertained, behind the statute.
This article explores the judicial expansion of section (b)(8) and
argues for words of limitation in the statute that would help to realize the
purpose of the statute. Part I of the article presents several case studies
which illustrate the arbitrary nature of the application of section (b)(8).
Part II leads the reader through a statutory analysis, a review of the
legislative history, a summary of the constitutional battles waged against
section (b)(8), and traces the evolution of the case law of statutory phrases
within section (b)(8). Part III of the article revisits the case studies and
outlines the implications of the overbreadth of the statute and the judicial
expansion of the statutory phrases. The final portion of the article
offers a solution to the problem and draws conclusions.

*
The author is the Public Defender for the County of Boone, State of Illinois.
He received his Juris Doctor in 1991 from the Northern Illinois University College of Law.
He also holds the degrees of Master of Science, Diploma of Education, and Graduate
Diploma of Educational Counseling. Previously, he has worked as a teacher and a science
researcher. The author wishes to acknowledge the generous help and assistance afforded by
Ms. Heidi Storz, in preparation of this article, and by Ms. Gaeli Miller, for her patience and
time spent typing various versions of this article.
1. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(b)(8) (2000).
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I. CASE STUDIES

A. John and Julie go out for a drink at a local tavern. Jerry has been
sitting at the bar for a while, and when Julie sits down on the stool next to
him, he strikes up a conversation with her. A few drinks later the
conversation becomes animated. John, feeling pangs of jealousy, tells Jerry
to back off. A scuffle ensues and both John and Jerry get thrown out of the
bar. John, still angry about the incident, goes to the police station and files
a complaint against Jerry.
B. Tracey comes out of the Shop-N-Go convenience store and runs
into her old rival, Nina. The two fifteen-year-olds go to the same school
and have a history of petty altercations. Upon seeing Nina, Tracey makes
an insulting comment. Both girls square off right there in the parking lot,
and Tracey scratches Nina and damages her clothes. When Nina arrives
home, her mother marches her straight to the police department to file a
complaint against Tracey.
C. Alan and Mary just graduated from high school. They are
sweethearts and spend the dog days of summer by the city pool. This is the
local teenage hangout, and so it happens that one day Beth is also at the
pool with her friends. Beth was Alan's prom date and is still very much
interested in him. When she sees Alan and Mary together, she approaches
them and yells out "you slut" to Mary. Mary gets out of the pool and
confronts Beth. Alan, also dripping from the pool, steps in and pushes
Beth. Beth falls and bruises her ankle. She hobbles all the way to the
police station to file a complaint against Alan.
Each of the foregoing scenarios are representative of actual cases
handled by a public defender. Mercifully for Jerry, Tracey, and Alan, the
prosecuting attorneys filing charges against them treated the cases as
misdemeanor batteries.
Under Illinois law, however, each of these
defendants could also have been prosecuted as a felon on aggravated
battery charges. The law does not adequately distinguish which factors in
the above scenarios should or should not trigger an aggravation of the
battery charge and thus the charging of "simple" battery or aggravated
battery has become very much a function of prosecutorial discretion.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The essential elements for the offense of battery in Illinois are
codified in chapter 720 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes at section 5/12-3.
Section (a) of the statute states that "a person commits battery if he
intentionally or knowingly without legal justification and by any means, (1)
causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an
insulting or provoking nature with an individual.",2 Section (b) of this
statute classifies battery as a Class A misdemeanor.3 Legislators have also
determined that the existence of certain factors in an altercation involving a
battery create a greater degree of culpability on the part of the offender, and
thus the legislature has provided for the enhancement of battery to
aggravated battery based on the existence of such aggravating factors. 4
This enhancement statute classifies the offense 6of aggravated battery
5
anywhere from a Class 3 felony to a Class X felony.
Aggravated battery has been divided into three categories. The first
includes "the more serious batteries which are not inflicted with a specific
intent to murder, rape, or rob and, therefore, [cannot] be prosecuted as
attempted murder, rape, or robbery." 7 The second category of aggravated
batteries does not involve great bodily harm. Rather, it involves batteries
committed under aggravated circumstances from which great harm might
result, although great harm is not required in any particular case. 8 Such
batteries arising under aggravated circumstances are considered to
constitute "a more serious threat to the community than a simple battery." 9
Finally, the third category of aggravated battery covers the unusual type of
battery which can precede a more serious offense such as rape, robbery, or
murder. 10
This article concerns itself with the second category of aggravated
batteries, namely those that occur under aggravated circumstances from
which great harm might result." In particular, this article examines section

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
Id.

5/12-3(a) (2000).
5/12-3(b) (2000).
5/12-4 (2000).
5/12-4(e) (2000).
5/12-14.1(b) (2000).

5/12-4(a) rev. comm. cmts. (West 1993).
5/12-4(b) rev. comm. cmts. (West 1993).

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(c) (2000).

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(b) (2000).
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(b)(8), which states that a person commits an aggravated battery if in
committing a battery, the person "is, or the person battered is, on or about a
public way, public property or public place of accommodation or
amusement." '1 2 This section of the statute has been interpreted and applied
in an ever more inclusive manner causing an increase in the enhancement
of batteries to aggravated batteries. Thus in practice, section (b)(8) has
swallowed misdemeanor or "simple" battery, but for those occasions when
prosecutors decide to pull "simple" battery out from within the belly of
aggravated battery.
A. INTERPRETING LEGISLATIVE INTENT

The expansion of section (b)(8) raises the question of whether the
legislature foresaw and intended such an all-inclusive enhancement statute
or whether the inclusivity of section (b)(8) has been judicially construed
beyond the intent of the statute. When interpreting a statute, courts are
required to give effect to the legislative intent of the statute. 13 The
legislature, however, created very little history regarding the intent behind
enacting section (b)(8), and, therefore, the courts have had to divine the
legislative intent behind section (b)(8) from circumstantial inferences. A
1977 court, for example, speculated that "the statute might have been
intended to remedy the deteriorating condition of public safety on the
streets, thereby calming the widespread reticence of citizens who fear travel
beyond their immediate neighborhoods ... [or t]he statute might also have
been intended to preserve public order in the tumultuous times through
' 4
which we have been passing since the early 1960s.'

12.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(b)(8) (2000).
13.
People v. Garrison, 412 N.E.2d 483, 489 (Ill. 1980). In Garrison, the public
indecency statute was implicated. Id. at 485. When that statute was passed, letters in a key
word of the statute had apparently been accidentally transposed. Id. at 489. These
transpositions rendered the statute unintelligible. Id. The court, however, examined the
legislative intent in passing the statute and applied the statute to the defendant as though the
transpositions had not occurred. Id.
14.
People v. Cole, 362 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977). In Cole, the victims
had allegedly honked at the car in which the defendant was riding because it had run a stop
sign. Id. at 434. The driver of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger then
followed the victims to their home. Id. The altercation at issue occurred in the victims'
driveway after they got out of their car. Id.
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A 1981 court stated
more simply that the intent of the statute is to
15
avoid harm to the public.
More recently, a 1990 case found that the legislature intended not only
"to protect the public, but also wanted the courts to have broad discretion in

determining whether a person committed a battery 'on or about a public6

'1
way' in order to facilitate reaching [the] goal [of protecting the public].
The court came to the conclusion that the legislature intended the courts to
have broad discretion merely because the legislature chose to include the
ambiguous word "about" in the statute. The court inferred that "the
legislature purposely chose terms with this flexibility in order to insure the
broad protection of the public health and safety. 1 7 The court, however,
also recognized its own limitations in evaluating legislative actions when it
stated that the issue of "whether the course chosen by the General
Assembly to achieve a desired result is either wise or the best means
available is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry."'" 19By 1991, the
divining came to an end and legislative intent became "clear.'

15.
People v. Ward, 419 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (I11.App. Ct. 1981). Testimony at trial
revealed that the defendant had battered the victim in her car while it was parked in a
Holiday Inn parking lot. Id. at 1242. The court found that because the battery occurred in an
area open to the public, it constituted a more serious threat to the community than a battery
committed elsewhere. Id. at 1244.
16.
People v. Lowe, 560 N.E.2d 438, 442 (I1l. App. Ct. 1990). In Lowe, a state park
superintendent observed the defendant driving on a park road. Id. at 439. As it appeared
that the defendant's load of hay exceeded the maximum weight limit for the park road, the
park superintendent followed defendant down the road to his farm. Id. The park
superintendent left his vehicle on the side of the park road, walked on to defendant's
property, and confronted defendant about the weight limit. Id. The defendant then shoved
the park superintendent towards his vehicle. The court found that the shoving occurred both
on defendant's property and on the public road. Id.
17.
Id. at 442.
18.
Id. at 444 (quoting Garcia v. Tully, 377 N.E.2d 10, 14 (I11.1978)).
19.
People v. Buie, 577 N.E.2d 941, 943 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION (B)(8)

The legislative history surrounding the adoption of section (b)(8) is
sparse and highly inferential. Moreover, courts have recognized their own
limitations in evaluating whether the language of section (b)(8) is the best
way of achieving the presumed legislative end. Nevertheless, section
(b)(8) has survived constitutional challenges several times. The first
attempt to raise a constitutional challenge was made in People v.
Lockwood.E°
In Judge Moran's dissenting opinion in Lockwood 2 he argues that
section (b)(8) "is so blatantly unconstitutional that we should raise its
constitutionality on our own motion, even though the question was not
raised in the trial court nor in this court. ''22 He goes on to state that in his
opinion "the fortuitous circumstances of being located upon a public way at
the instant a simple battery occurs does not warrant the transformation of
the same act from simple battery . . . to aggravated battery., 23 He
maintains that "in order for a statute to meet the constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the laws, a legislative classification
must be based upon some difference which has a reasonable relation to the
act in respect to which the classification is proposed., 24 Judge Moran
postulates that this is not the case with section (b)(8). Rather, he argues
that the statute is overbroad because the statute is based on an arbitrary
private versus public way distinction.25 Judge Moran points out that there
is no inherent social evil in committing a battery upon public property

20.
People v. Lockwood, 346 N.E.2d 404 (I11.
App. Ct. 1976). The defense raised
no constitutional challenges on appeal, and the majority opinion in Lockwood did not
recognize that any constitutional issues were presented by the case. Judge Moran raised the
constitutional challenge in his dissenting opinion and stated that the case should be reversed
because section (b)(8) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 408-09.
21.
Id. at 407. The facts adduced at trial indicated that the defendant approached his
girlfriend and her friend in their car. Id. at 405. Defendant demanded his car keys from
his girlfriend who refused to give them to him because of his intoxicated state. Id.
Defendant grabbed his girlfriend, pulled her from the car, and slapped her. The girlfriend's
friend then drove to a nearby school parking lot. Id. The defendant and his girlfriend
followed and the defendant got in a physical confrontation with the friend, who later
reported her injuries to the police. Id.
22. Id.at 408.
23.
Id.
24. People v. Lockwood, 346 N.E.2d 404, 409 (I11.
App. Ct. 1976).
25.
Id.at 410.

2001]

Is THERE No SIMPLE BArrERY

UNDER ILLINOIS LAw?

where there is no further evidence to show that the public was or could
have been endangered in some fashion.26
Judge Moran's dissent in Lockwood has gone largely unheeded,
however, and only a year later the Fourth District Appellate Court thwarted
a constitutional challenge to section (b)(8) in People v. Cole.27 The court in
Cole found that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of both the state and Federal constitutions and reasoned
that the government may recognize and act upon factual differences which
exist between individuals, classes, and events so long as the individuals
themselves remain equal in the eyes of the law.28 Moreover, the court
stated that the police power of the state "may be broadly exercised by the
legislature to preserve public health, morals, welfare and safety. 29 Thus,
the court in Cole clung to the illusion that the broadness and facial
neutrality of section (b)(8) ensure its equal application without recognizing
that it is precisely that neutral vagueness which serves to foster the
opportunity for unequal application of the statute.
The issue of the statute's broadness or vagueness was again brought
before the Fourth District Appellate Court in 1983. In People v. Handley,3 °
the appellant argued that section (b)(8) was unconstitutionally vague, in
that the statute was insufficiently precise to give fair notice of what conduct
is proscribed by it. 3' The court, however, stated that "the mere fact that the
legislature chose a general description of areas frequented by the public...
rather than spelling out each example of a public way or public amusement
does not make the statute void for vagueness. 32 Additionally, the court
rejected the appellant's argument regarding the arbitrariness of the statute.
The appellant argued that if he had been several steps further to one side
when he committed the battery, he would have been in someone's private
residence and, therefore, could not have been charged with aggravated
battery under section (b)(8). While the court rightly pointed out that the

26.
Id. at 409.
27.
Cole, 362 N.E.2d at 435.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
454 N.E.2d 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). In Handley, the defendant battered the
victim outside of the victim's apartment. Id. at 351. The apartment was located inside
Crazy Jerry's Adult Bookstore and the entrance to the apartment was adjacent to a
projection room in which individual booths were located to view pornographic films. Id.
The battery occurred several feet from the apartment entrance within the confines of the
projection room. Id. Both the adult bookstore and the projection room were open to the
public. Id. However, there is no evidence to suggest that any members of the public were
actually there. Id.
31.
Id. at 352.
32.
Id.
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appellant could then have been punished more severely for having
committed the class X felony of home invasion, it failed to realize that the
scenario exemplifies the eradication of "simple" battery by the aggravated
battery statute. There is nowhere the appellant could have stood so as to
have committed only misdemeanor battery.
The Fourth District was forced to revisit its Handley decision in 1990,
when in People v. Lowe the constitutionality of the statute was again
contested.33 In Lowe, the defendant was tried for aggravated battery on the
ground that he shoved a park superintendent off the defendant's property.34
During deliberations, the jury directed a question to the trial court which
stated, "what does 'about' mean in 'on or about public property'?"3 5 The
trial judge instructed the jury that "about" means "in the immediate
neighborhood of; near., 36 Defense counsel objected to the instruction. On
appeal, the defense argued that the instruction violated defendant's due
process rights because the statute, together with the trial judge's loose jury
instruction, was so vague that it could be interpreted to prohibit the
justifiable use of force to remove a trespasser from one's own property
merely because one's property happened to be near a "public way.'
Defense counsel suggested that a more appropriate definition of the word
"about"- would be "so close to the public way as to interfere with the
public's travel. 38
The appellate court, however, disagreed with the definition advanced
by the defense and found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.
The court held that the statute met the due process requirements of both the
United States and Illinois Constitutions, as neither constitution imposed the
impossible burden of mathematical certainty on a statute. 39 Thus, despite
the statute not identifying an exact boundary line as to a "public way," the
court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because the
intent behind the statute was also to protect those members of the public
who were not with absolute certainty "on" a public way.4 °
The defense in Lowe pointed out that such an interpretation of the
statute created a distinction between a landowner who removes a trespasser
onto other privately owned land and a landowner who removes a trespasser

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Lowe, 560 N.E.2d at 441.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 440-41.
Id.at 441.
Lowe, 560 N.E.2d at 443.
Id.
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"on or about a public way.; ' The defendant challenged that distinction as
violating the Equal Protection Clause, but the court summarily dismissed
the argument using the rationale from Cole that such a classification was
reasonable, not arbitrary, given the intent of the legislature to protect the
public.42 Furthermore, the appellate court refused to examine more closely
the issue of whether the statute had a fair and substantial relation to the
objective of the legislature, deferring instead to the General Assembly.4 3
The most recent constitutional challenge to section (b)(8) was made in
People v. Buie.44 In Buie, the defendant raised an Equal Protection
argument contending that there was no rational basis for elevating simple
battery to aggravated battery just because the battery occurred on a public
way. 5 The Fifth District Appellate Court, however, had little patience for
the argument and stated in a conclusory manner that section (b)(8) met
constitutional scrutiny because the elevation of simple battery
to
46
aggravated battery related directly to the harm sought to be remedied.
In determining the constitutionality of section (b)(8), courts have paid
deference to the legislature and have avoided assessing whether the course
chosen by the legislature to protect the public from batteries was the best
means available to achieve that desired result. Courts, however, have
exercised little restraint in creating definitions for the concepts of "on or
about a public way" and "public place of accommodation or amusement."
As a result, the concepts and the statutory subsection itself have ballooned
into universals. It has become difficult to distinguish what, beyond the
strictest confines of a personal residence, might not be considered "a public
way." THis in turn has opened the doors for the abuse of prosecutorial
discretion.

41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 444.
44.
577 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). In Buie, the defendant and his friends
attacked two teenagers while they were walking down a storefront sidewalk. Id. at 942.
During the course of the beating, a knife was pulled and held to one of the boy's throat. Id.
The facts suggest that defendant would more appropriately have been charged with
aggravated battery under section (b)(1) for use of a deadly weapon. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12-4(b)(1) (2000). However, because section (b)(8) has become such a "catch-all," or
universal for aggravated battery, the defendant was charged under that section instead. Buie,
577 N.E.2d at 942.
45.
Buie, 577 N.E.2d at 943.
46.
Id.
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C. JUDICIALLY CREATED DEFINITIONS OF "ON OR ABOUT A PUBLIC WAY"

In People v. Clark,47 the Fifth District Appellate Court was called
upon to construe the phrase "on or about a public way."'48 Having found no
previous cases which had done so, the court looked to the statute's
legislative history for guidance. After such review, the court inferred that
the intent behind the statute was to protect an innocent member of the
public who might also be situated upon the public way and, thus, would be
endangered by a battery committed in close proximity to his person.49
In Clark, the battery in question was committed on a dirt lane which
was neither well-marked nor well-traveled, and was apparently on private
property. °
The court found that a battery committed under such
circumstances would not pose an increased threat to an innocent member of
the public and should therefore be prosecuted only as misdemeanor
battery. 5' Thus, "on or about a public way" was in essence construed as
"not on or about private property" and "not on or about property
unfrequented by the public."
Two years later in People v. Ward,52 the Second District Appellate
Court broadened the definition of "on or about a public way" to apply to
batteries that occurred in a public area, regardless of whether the property
was privately or publicly owned.53 According to the Ward court, "what is
significant is that the alleged offense occurred in an area accessible to the
public., 54 The defendant in Ward battered a woman while she was sitting
in a privately owned vehicle parked in a privately owned Holiday Inn
parking lot.55 However, because the court found that the location was
accessible to the public, it held that the defendant was properly charged

47.
388 N.E.2d 1107, (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
48.
Id. at 1108. The defendant was convicted of aggravated battery after a bench
trial. The only issue on appeal was whether the battery, which admittedly occurred, took
place "on or about a public way." Id. The appellate court reduced defendant's conviction
for aggravated battery and remanded the case for sentencing on the modified judgment of
battery. Id. at 1110.
49.
Id. at 1109.
50.
Id. at 1108.
51.
Id. at 1109.
52.
419 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Il. App. Ct. 1981).
53.
Id. at 1244. While the court did not specifically differentiate the "public way"
clause from the "public property" clause in Ward, the court's conclusion that a "public way"
need not be publicly owned is consistent with the rules of statutory construction. If a public
way also had to be public property, the inclusion of "public way" in addition to "public
property" in the statute would be rendered analytically superfluous.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 1242.
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with aggravated battery. The court made this finding despite the fact that
no evidence was presented at trial to show that any innocent member of the
public had actually been in the vicinity or had been endangered because of
56
the battery.
The Third District, in People v. Kamp, subsequently affirmed the
stance of the Second District and reiterated that the property on which a
battery occurred need not be shown to be publicly owned to be considered
"a public way" for purposes of the statutory definition of aggravated
battery. 7 Moreover, the court substantiated the requirement that the
location where the battery occurred merely needs to be accessible to the
public to qualify as a "public way" under section (b)(8).
The defendant in Kamp was charged with felony-murder, the
underlying felony being aggravated battery as set forth in section (b)(8).5 8
The defendant asserted that because the State presented no evidence at trial
that the park where the murder allegedly occurred was publicly owned, the
State failed to prove the element of "on or about a public way" required for
the underlying aggravated battery.5 9 The court, however, found that the
State did not need to present such proof. The State merely needed to show
that the area in question was accessible to the public. The court found the
State's evidence, which established that neighborhood children sometimes
played in the park, was sufficient to show that the park was accessible to
the public for purposes of meeting the "public way" requirement under
section (b)(8). 60
The actual ownership of the park, whether public or private, had
become irrelevant in construing the meaning of "on or about a public way."
Rather, "on or about a public way" was in essence supplanted by "a

56.
Id. Two subsequent First District cases also found private parking lots to be
publicly accessible locations and thus found that the parking lots met the criteria for "on or
about a public way." In People v. Williams, the battery at issue occurred on a private
parking lot within short distances from where restaurant patrons and apartment house
residents were actually present. 515 N.E.2d 266, 267-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). The private
parking lot was considered to be a "public way" for purposes of section (b)(8). Id. at 271.
In People v. Pugh, a private parking lot used by apartment residents was found to be a
"public way." 516 N.E.2d 396, 399 (I11.
App. Ct. 1987). However, no evidence was
adduced at trial that members of the public were in the vicinity of the parking lot when the
battery occurred. Id. at 398.
57.
476 N.E.2d 768, 770 (I11.
App. Ct. 1985). The victim in Kamp drowned in a
park drainage ditch. Id. at 769. The defendant appealed his conviction partly on the
grounds that the State failed to prove that the victim's death was caused by criminal agency.
Id. at 770.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60. Id. at 771.
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location accessible to the public." This was regardless of whether the
public actually accessed the location or was endangered by the battery.
Once the courts established that a "public way" need not be construed
as a place owned by a public entity, but merely as a place accessible to the
public, section (b)(8) became the aggravated battery of choice. Section
(b)(8) could easily be applied to most batteries if the prosecution sought an
enhanced conviction. Section (b)(8) has since been applied to include not
only the private parking lots and parks previously described, but also paths
between privately owned universit6 dormitory buildings 61 and alley ways
behind privately owned businesses.
D. JUDICIALLY CREATED DEFINITIONS OF "PUBLIC PLACE OF
ACCOMMODATION OR AMUSEMENT"

Few cases have construed the meaning of "public place of
accommodation or amusement" for purposes of section (b)(8). In 1980, the
First District Appellate Court drew analogies from the earlier Clark
decision and held that in construing the phrase "public place of
accommodation or amusement" a narrow reading was required.63 In
People v. Johnson, the battery occurred in the washroom of a privately
owned tavem. 64 The court held that "to extend the application of the statute

See People v. Pennington, 527 N.E.2d 76 (I11.App. Ct. 1988). In Pennington,
61.
the defendant attacked a college student walking on a path between dormitory buildings. Id.
at 77. The dormitories were privately owned, but the dormitory manager allowed nonresidents who traveled between an apartment complex and the university campus to use the
path and lawn. Id. at 78.
See People v. Sutton, 624 N.E.2d 1189 (I11.App. Ct. 1993). In Sutton, the
62.
defendant was sentenced for attempted aggravated sexual assault and for aggravated battery.
Id. The victim was a woman who suffered from spina bifida and the battery occurred in an
alley way. Id. at 1193. The defendant was charged with aggravated battery under both
section (b)(14) and section (b)(8). Id. at 1201. Section (b)(14) entails a battery committed
on someone known to be physically handicapped. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(b)(14)
(2000). The fact that the defendant could also be charged under section (b)(8), as it has
emerged, illustrates how universal that section has become.
People v. Johnson, 409 N.E.2d 48, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). In Johnson, the
63.
defendant was convicted of a stabbing incident in a tavern restroom. Id. at 49. The court
held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the use of deadly force to
prevent the commission of forcible felony on the basis that the victim, according to
defendant's testimony, had committed aggravated battery. Id. at 50. The court ruled that
the victim had not committed aggravated battery, because the battery occurred in a tavern
restroom which was not considered a "public place of accommodation or amusement" under
section (b)(8). Id.
Id. at 50.
64.
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to the tavern restroom involved herein could conceivably broaden the
implications of the statute to situations clearly not intended to be
encompassed within it."'65 In arriving at this determination, the court
considered the fact that a tavern is private property open to the public only
for a limited purpose.66 Thus, the court exempted from the purview of the
phrase "public place of accommodation" places where the public had
limited access.
The warning of the First District Appellate Court to avoid broadening
the meaning of the statute beyond what the legislature ,intended went
unheeded, however, and in 1986, the Third District found a privatelyowned tavern to be a public place of accommodation. 67 The court rejected
all earlier cases, claiming that they were not controlling, and suggested,
instead, that the phrase "place of public accommodation or amusement"
seemed "to apply generically to places where the public is invited to come
into and partake of whatever is being offered therein., 68 The court further
stated that while it doubted that a bar fight "should be characterized as
felonious, nevertheless, the statute appears to go that way., 69 However,
despite its own apparent misgivings, the court refused to find that the
phrase was ambiguous and, thus, deemed that it had no obligation to
construe the phrase in favor of the defendant. 70 As a result, according to
the Murphy court, the phrase "public place of accommodation or
amusement" had become any place in which members of the public were
invitees and could partake of the offerings of the place. 7 1

65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
People v. Murphy, 496 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). In Murphy, the
defendant and two other men were involved in a bar fight at a tavern called the Village
Pump. Id. at 13. One of the men was injured. Id. The defendant claimed self-defense and
that the battery, if any, was a simple battery. Id. The trial court rejected defendant's
arguments and found him guilty as charged. Id.
68.
Id. at 14.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
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The evolving definition of "public place of accommodation" soon
became more convoluted when, in People v. Lee, 72 the Fourth District
Appellate Court found that the parking lot of a convenience store
constituted a public place of accommodation for purposes of the aggravated
battery statute.73 A previous case already established that a parking lot
qualified as a "public way" under section (b)(8), 74 but now the court also
injected parking lots into the realm of public places of accommodation.
The court stated that it saw "no logical or reasonable basis for interpreting
the language of this subsection so as to distinguish between the premises
within the epublic place of accommodation' and the parking lot
immediately outside its door., 75 While the outcome may have been the
same for the defendant in Lee regardless of whether he was prosecuted for
committing a battery on a public way or in a public place of
accommodation, the case illustrates the looseness with which the courts
began to apply the statute, a looseness which has pulled the statute away
from the evils the statute was intended to proscribe.
Making a valiant effort to clarify what constitutes a "public place of
accommodation or amusement," the court in People v. Longston concluded
that a jury instruction stating unequivocally that a tavern was a place of
public amusement was an incorrect statement of the law.76 The Fourth
District Appellate Court recognized that a tavern does not necessarily give
the requisite access to the public to qualify as "a place of public
amusement., 77 A tavern could, for example, house a very private exclusive
clubhouse with no access to the public. 78 Rather, the court found that for a
place to qualify as a public place of accommodation or amusement, the
public nature of such an establishment must be conclusively proven. 79

People v. Lee, 512 N.E.2d 92 (I11.App. Ct. 1987).
72.
Id. at 95. In Lee, the defendant attempted to steal two 12-packs of beer from a
73.
convenience store. The complaining witness, a store employee, followed the defendant into
the parking lot of the store and grabbed the defendant. The defendant then hit the
complaining witness with his fist. Id. at 92.
People v. Ward, 419 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (I11.App. Ct. 1981).
74.
Lee, 512 N.E.2d at 95.
75.
People v. Logston, 553 N.E.2d 88, 90 (I11.App. Ct. 1990). In Logston, the
76.
defendant was involved in a fight while he was at a bar called the Winner's Lounge. Id. at
88. A witness testified that the Winner's Lounge was a "public bar-tavern." Id. On crossexamination, however, the witness admitted that minors were not allowed in the building
without their parents. Id. Defendant argued that because the tavern excluded some
members of the public, it was not a public place of amusement pursuant to section (b)(8). Id.
Id. at 90.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
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Is THERE No SIMPLE BATTERY

UNDER ILLINOIS LAW?

Reflecting the various judicial interpretations of the phrase, "public
place of accommodation or amusement," in the context of section (b)(8)
seems to have emerged as any place into which members of the public are
invited, to partake of the offerings of the place, so long as the public nature
of the place in question has been proven conclusively. Application of this
definition in Johnson, however, would have included the tavern washroom
expressly excluded as a public place of accommodation. After all, the
public in the tavern is invited and probably encouraged to enter the
restroom, and once there may partake of the restroom's offerings. This
contradiction between what the Johnson court determined was intended by
the phrase "public place of accommodation and amusement," and what has
been constructed out of the phrase exemplifies the misguided nature of
section (b)(8) as it is written. It is simply too vague to be applied
consistently and to accomplish the inferred legislative goal of the statute.
III. IMPLICATIONS

In light of the previous discussion describing the ever expanding
scope of section (b)(8), it is hard to conceive of a situs for a battery, which
will not qualify as "on or about a public way," or "public place of
accommodation and amusement."
Any situs where people meet and
interact - a street, a park, a parking lot, shop or supermarket - are all within
the ambit of the expansive interpretation of section (b)(8). The only
conceivable place where an unlawful physical contact between two people
still remains a simple or misdemeanor battery is within the confines of a
home or an apartment. 80 Such conduct however, may expose one to either
the charge of domestic battery or home invasion. Notwithstanding the
difficulties in ascertaining the legislative intent behind section (b)(8), it is
safe to assume that the legislature by enacting section (b)(8), did not intend
to write the misdemeanor battery statute out of the statute books.
Whether someone is charged with misdemeanor battery or felony
battery can have an enormous impact on the course of that person's life.
Referring once again to the case studies, instead of college for Alan, for
example, a charge of felony battery might mean time in jail and exposure to
the less desirable "elements" in life. In the context of someone's life, it is
important to recognize the ease with which prosecutors could have charged
Jerry, Tracey, and Alan with the felony of aggravated battery if, perhaps,
their names were Juan, Tanika, and Jamal. What check would there be on

80.
The common areas of an apartment building would surely fall under the
definition of a "public way."
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prosecutors charging defendants with enhanced batteries on the basis of
race or any other invidious form of discrimination?
Section (b)(8) provides no check on the abuse of prosecutorial
discretion because, as the statute was written and has subsequently been
interpreted by the judiciary, it has become extremely inclusive. Moreover,
and of far greater importance, the statute cannot accomplish what the
legislature presumably intended when drafting the statute, namely, to
protect the public from the harm of batteries committed in the presence of
the public.
RESOLUTION

The overbreadth problem of section (b)(8), as it was written and as it
has been applied, is not intransigent, however. In fact, the problem itself
suggests the solution. Judge Moran came upon the solution long ago
when, in his prophetic Lockwood dissent, he argued for additional words
of limitation in the statute to ensure that only those batteries which
actually endanger, or might logically endanger, the public are enhanced
to class 3 felonies as aggravated batteries. 8' Similarly, defense counsel
in Lowe hit on the solution when it argued for an interpretation of the
"so close to the public way as to
word "about" in the statute as being
82
travel.,
public's
the
with
interfere
If the legislature really intended to exercise its broad discretion in the
protection of the public health and safety,83 and drafted the statute to avoid
harm to the public, 84 then. it only has to add a few words to the statute to
accomplish that goal. Thus, a person could be charged with aggravated
battery if, in committing a battery, the person or the person battered is on or
about a public way, public property, or a public place of accommodation or
amusement and such conduct endangers another person. These few
words would require an additional element of proof that would make
section (b)(8) clear and unambiguous.
Simple words of limitation enacted by the legislature can accomplish
what years of judicial inquiry and interpretation have been unable to
effectuate. Such words can rationally relate the statute to the harm sought
to be prevented and can help to ensure that defendants do not fall victim to
the abuse of prosecutorial discretion under section (b)(8).

81.
82.
83.
84.

People v. Lockwood, 346 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
App. Ct. 1990).
People v. Lowe, 560 N.E.2d 438, 440 (I11.
Id. at 442.
People v. Ward, 419 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).

